主讲人：戴亮 教授（香港中文大学（深圳））

主持人：余莉 助理教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

嘉宾介绍：田建荣 教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

时间：2026年10月30日（周五）  10：00-11：30（北京时间）

地点：辽宁大学蒲河校区经济学部大楼483会议室

语言：中文/英文

摘要：We develop a dynamic contracting framework to study how partial commitment power affects long-term employment relationships. In a continuous-time moral hazard model, the principal can alter the contract at random, exogenously timed "alteration opportunities," with the arrival rate measuring her (lack of) commitment power. Our results depend on the relative observability of the agent's diligence and misconduct. For guardian jobs, where misconduct is easier to observe, it is optimal to offer a static, permanent contract that pays fixed performance bonuses for observed diligence and remains immune to reductions in commitment power. For entrepreneurial jobs, where diligence is easier to observe, the optimal structure features an initial probation period, a promotion bonus upon achieving permanence, and a return to probation at each alteration opportunity. In this case, weaker commitment can, under certain conditions, improve welfare; if commitment power is already low, further reductions may yield Pareto improvements. Reduced commitment power also raises required promotion and performance bonuses, shortens probation, and accelerates the decline in promotion bonuses over time.

主讲人简介：

戴亮，香港中文大学（深圳）助理教授，2015年在美国普林斯顿大学获得经济学博士学位，2015至2023年任教于上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，先后任助理教授、副教授，2023年10月至今任香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院助理教授，主要研究方向为微观经济学理论和金融学，研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Financial Studies等国际一流期刊，主持国家自然科学基金面上项目。