主讲人：周艺艺副教授（纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系）

主持人：张岸洲助理教授（辽宁大学李安民经济研究院）

嘉宾介绍：马湘君教授（辽宁大学经济学部）

时间：2023年3月10日（周五）  10：00-11：30（北京时间）

地点：腾讯会议：300 7551 6895

语言：中文/英文

摘要：

This paper studies the role of observational learning in search markets where buyers do not take the list price as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Using a unique data from the Beijing housing market, we estimate a structural model in which buyers infer a seller’s reservation value from the home’s list price, time-on-market, and records of in-person home viewings by prior prospective buyers, after which they decide whether to view the home and how much to offer. We use the estimated model to quantify the welfare impact of different information disclosure rules. We find that buyer surplus is reduced, and seller surplus is increased on average if time-on-market information is disclosed. However, disclosing home-viewing information in addition to time-on-market information affects individual homes differently. We find that due to the disclosure of this additional information, buyers are slightly better off while sellers are slightly worse off on average.

主讲人简介：周艺艺，纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系终身副教授（tenured）、博士生导师。博士毕业于弗吉尼亚大学，硕士毕业于北京大学中国经济研究中心，主要研究领域为产业组织和环境经济学，多篇论文发表于Management Science、The RAND Journal of Economics、Journal of Industrial Economics、Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economist等一流国际学术期刊。主要讲授《产业经济学》、《实证产业经济学》、《健康经济学》、《管理经济学》、《商业战略》等课程。